There are two important rules in a patent race: what an innovator must accomplish to receive the patent and the allocation of the benefits that flow from the innovation. Most patent races end before R&D is completed and the prize to the innovator is often less than the social benefit of the innovation. We study the optimal combination of prize and minimal accomplishment necessary to obtain a patent in a dynamic multistage innovation race. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms, chooses the innovation stage at which the patent is awarded and the magnitude of the prize to the winner. We examine both social surplus and consumer surplus maximizing patent race rules. We show that a key consideration is the efficiency costs of prizes and of monopoly power to the patentholder. Our results indicate that races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms have similar technologies, and the planner maximizes social surplus. In all other circumstances, the optimal policy spurs innovative effort through a race of nontrivial duration. Races are also used to filter out inferior innovators. JEL: C61, C63, C73, L43, L50
Introduction
Patent systems use races to spur innovation. Firms compete to be the first to develop a new product and obtain a patent and monopoly rights to sell that product. It's been long argued (see Wright (1983) for an earlier criticism) that patent systems may be suboptimal mechanisms because they spark races and generate wasteful duplication of effort. As Loury (1979) noted, races also have offsetting benefits: increased investment leads to quicker innovation. Therefore a patent system designed to encourage innovation must carefully weigh the benefits of quick innovation against the over-investment cost generated by races. In this paper, we provide a model of optimal patent rules that endogenizes the choice of races in designing incentives for innovation. Our environment has two important features. First, we assume that innovation is a multistage process and find that the waste induced by patent races can be moderated by filing requirements, that is, by deciding the stage of an innovation process at which the patent is granted. Second, we explicitly model the product market inefficiencies of a patent monopoly and argue that these inefficiencies must be considered along with any waste generated by a patent race when evaluating patent policies. In general, there are two ways to stimulate innovation: offer a big prize to a single innovator, or offer a smaller prize but use a race to threaten each firm that the prize will go to his competitor. When both incentive devices have inefficiencies, it is generally best to use both.
We model races as multistage stochastic games between heterogenous firms. Firms differ in their cost of innovation. They proceed through several stages of progress (e.g. rough idea, blue print, prototype), with the final stage culminating in successful innovation and a marketable product. For a given patent policy, our dynamic, stochastic innovation race resembles those studied by Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Vickers (1985a,b, 1987) . However, we endogenize patent policy by embedding this game into the problem of a patent authority that selects the rules governing the races.
We study the optimal policy of a patent authority who can verify partial success at the time of a patent application, but cannot observe an individual firm's efficiency. The patent authority has access to policy tools typically used in patent systems. First, it chooses when to award the patent, namely, it chooses the innovation stage at which a patent or an exclusive contract is awarded to a firm and the race is terminated. This represents the minimal accomplishment necessary and the filing requirements to obtain a patent and sets the length of a patent race. Firms race as long as no firm has achieved this level, but as soon as one has met the requirements of the patent rules, it proceeds with exclusive rights to develop the product. Second, the authority chooses how much of the benefits of an innovation go to the patent holder. This allocation is affected by rules such as patent length, patent breadth, and renewal fees.
Most analyses of patent policy focus on the optimal duration and breadth of patent protection 1 , 1 For example, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) , O'Donoghue et al. (1998) , Denicolo (1999) , Hopenhayn and Mitchell but assume that a firm does not receive a patent until its R&D process is complete 2 . We distinguish between the stage a patent is granted and the end of the innovation process. This distinction allows us to evaluate the desirability of races and to analyze the effects of the race length on the pace and cost of innovation preceding and following a patent. This assumption is consistent with actual innovation processes. Firms often receive patents for a product in its early development stages, bear significant expenditures afterwards and reap financial benefits only when R&D is finished and the product is marketed. This feature is seen in many of the case histories of important inventions examined in Jewkes et al. (1969) . For example, the first patents for xerography were granted many years before the first copy machine, and far more money was spent on development of the transistor after the patent was granted than before. When a patent should be granted represents a fundamental question in the design of patent policy. We show that this choice has important implications for the costs and benefits of innovation.
In our environment, the patent authority must weigh three considerations. These are the time at which R&D is completed and the product is ready, the potential waste of a patent race and the welfare loss in the product market from patent monopolies. If we make the conventional assumption that no patent is granted until all R&D is completed and choose a long life for the patent, then there will be much over-investment in the patent race and large welfare loss from the patent monopoly, but an early product introduction time. The waste in the patent race can be eliminated by an early grant of the patent or a smaller reward. Decreasing the value of the patent, by lowering patent length and breadth, will reduce the product market inefficiencies, and reduce the excessive investment activity, but may lead to poor intertemporal resource allocation in a multistage patent race. Additionally, it may be difficult to filter out the less efficient firm when patents are granted early; even firms with larger costs of innovation may find it feasible to compete for a few stages to obtain a valuable patent.
A priori, it is not obvious which effect dominates in choosing the optimal policy.
We show that both policy instruments, when to award the patent and rewards to the winner, will generally be used to spur competition and innovation. In most circumstances, under reasonable assumptions about product markets, it is optimal for a social surplus maximizing patent authority to grant a patent after considerable progress has been made by the firms. In other words, races are desirable. They serve two important purposes in our model. First, the patent authority uses races to motivate innovators when the prize alone cannot, due to inefficiencies or limitations, provide adequate incentives. Second, a patent race serves as a filtering device. A race is used to increase the chance that the patent is rewarded to the most efficient innovator.
Another important factor that influences the optimal mix of the two policy instruments is the preferences of the patent authority. We consider two different specifications -social and consumer surplus -whereas most analyses in the patent literature focus only on social surplus. We examine (2001) , Wright (1999) , Green and Scotchmer (1995) .
2 Perry and Vincent (2002) is an exception. See Section 3 for a more thorough comparison of their setup and ours.
optimal patent policy when the patent authority maximizes consumer surplus because it may represent the preferences of the median voter who is likely to be a consumer waiting for new goods.
We show that consumer surplus maximizing patent authorities always prefer races, with or without product market distortions.
Our choice of patent policy instruments is influenced by existent national patent institutions.
National patent systems are applied uniformly to all inventions and use a small set of tools such as filing requirements, duration and scope of a patent, and renewal fees. 3 Our focus is on the trade-offs between using a race versus wealth transfers to the winner, so we examine the interaction of two instruments: when to grant a patent and the value of the patent to the winner. The value of the patent incorporates other patent policy details such as breadth, duration and scope, therefore we do not model them separately. We also find that our insights are robust to the addition of other instruments. For example, we consider the possibility of using an auction to find the more efficient innovator and avoid excessive transfers to it. We show that when deadweight losses from patent monopolies and/or patent prizes are significant, races are still part of the optimal patent policy even when auctions are available. The key fact is that racing is a useful alternative to stimulating innovative effort when the use of large prizes as an incentive device is limited by their nontrivial inefficiency costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model of a patent race and describes the patent authority's problem. Section 3 discusses the relevant literature and elaborates on the differences between our approach and those contained in related papers. Section 4 reports our numerical results and provides robustness checks. Section 5 discusses optimal patent policies when the patent authority has little information about the costs and benefits of innovation. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of possible extensions of the present analysis. All proofs and a detailed description of our numerical method are included in the Appendices.
A Model of Patent Policy for Multistage R&D Processes
We use a multistage stochastic innovation race model to evaluate patent policies. The introduction of a new product requires the completion of N stages of development by profit-maximizing firms that differ in their cost of R&D effort. We assume that each firm controls a separate innovation process. They have perfect information about each other's cost structure and position and choose their investment levels simultaneously. Each firm begins at stage 0 and the firm that first reaches the 3 Our model can also be used in a procurement context. The main distinction between patent systems and procurement problems is that in the latter case, the buyer can draw on a much larger set of instruments to give proper incentives to competitors. For example, the buyer could offer some payments to the loser and could require some interim reporting to monitor firms' progress. In procurement problems, each buyer can design an incentive system that is tailored for the particular product in question. Our focus in this paper is on national patent systems which use limited set of instruments.
stage D ≤ N obtains exclusive rights to continue. The value of D corresponds to filing requirements for a patent. After winning the race, the patentholder completes the final N − D stages without competition. When the patentholder reaches stage N , the patentholder markets the new product and earns the rents from a patent monopoly.
We use D to represent a firm's effort before it receives a patent relative to the total effort required to produce a marketable good. Our model calibrates costs so that D/N roughly represents the fraction of total expected cost incurred before a patent is granted. It is clear that D is neither 0 nor N in most patent systems: for most industries substantial expenditures occur before and after patents are granted. For example, pharmaceutical firms bear large R&D cost before receiving patents, but most also spend large sums on proving the safety and efficacy of any drug after receiving the patent.
Our environment allows us to analyze the trade-off between extended monopoly power given to a patent recipient if D = 0 and the cost of duplicated effort in a long race if D = N . We also examine how the choice of D affects the other parameters of patent policy.
A patent granting authority (hereafter, PGA), who cannot continuously monitor all races and has imperfect information about the cost structures of firms involved, chooses the rules that govern races. Consistent with real patent systems, we assume that the PGA has only two policy tools: Ω, the prize to the patentholder, and D, the stage at which a patent is awarded. If D = 0, then there is no race. It also represents the case where the patent requirements are so minor that the patent goes to whomever, with trivial effort, first comes up with the barest notion of the innovation. In the game, it formally corresponds to the PGA giving the patent at random to one of the firms. The key assumption is that in this case each firm has equal chance of winning without having made any investment. The prize, on the other hand, may be literally a cash prize or, like a patent, it may be a grant of a monopoly which produces a profit flow with present value Ω. In the latter case, Ω is meant to represent many features of a patent. For example, Ω is small if the patent life is short or if it has small breadth, or if renewal fees are large. We tacitly assume that patent breadth, length, renewal fee rules that are associated with a specific Ω have already been determined by the PGA.
We next model the post-innovation market. We let B denote the potential value to society from the invention. This includes the potential social surplus of a new good as well as any technological or knowledge spillover into other markets. The allocation of social benefits B is affected by patent policies. Figure 1 displays the per-period allocation before the patent has expired. Suppose that demand is given by DD and that there is a constant marginal cost of production. Figure 1 assumes that the patentholder can sell the new good at the monopoly price, but not engage in price discrimination, creating a profit P f for the firm and leaving consumers with a surplus of CS. The area H represents the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.
Once the patent has expired, the good is assumed to sell competitively at marginal cost, implying that consumers will receive all the social benefits, which equal CS + P f + H. Profits from patents are proportional to demand, and, therefore, roughly proportional to social benefits B. Hence we assume that the prize to the patentholder is Ω = γB; it equals a proportion γ of the present value of potential social benefit.
In Figure 1 , the deadweight loss H represents the social cost of monopoly profits in the patent system. 4 More generally, we assume that the deadweight loss is proportional to the profits received by the innovator, and is equal to θΩ = θγB for some θ ≥ 0. For example, θ = 0.5 in Figure 1 . This linear specification for the deadweight loss captures the basic point that γ > 0 causes inefficiencies, and is an exact description of this loss when demand is linear and marginal costs are constant, as well as, when demand has constant elasticity and marginal cost is zero. There are similar inefficiencies
when Ω is a cash prize financed by distortionary taxes. In that case, θ represents the marginal efficiency cost of funds, a number which can plausibly be as low as 0.1 or as high as 1, depending on estimates of various elasticities, tax policy parameters, and the source of marginal funds; see Judd (1987) for a discussion of these factors. Therefore, the θ parameter represents either the relation between deadweight loss and profits for monopoly or the marginal efficiency cost of tax revenue.
While any patent is in effect, the firm receives profits, the consumers receive some benefit, but some of B is wasted in the transfer process. We assume that the patentholder's profits are γB but that the deadweight loss due to inefficiencies is θγB, leaving consumers with B − γB − θγB.
We consider two different specifications of the PGA's preferences: social and consumer surplus.
Most analyses assume that social surplus is the appropriate objective, but it is not clear that this 4 Price controls may be used to reduce the deadweight loss, but they would also reduce monopoly profits and the prize. Long-lived patents increase γ but at the expense of increasing the total deadweight losses of monopoly. Cash prizes may be granted by the PGA along with shorter duration patents. This reduces the time during which the market experiences the deadweight loss H, but it only creates other inefficiencies since society bears the distortionary cost of the taxes used to finance the prize. 
The Firms: A Multistage Model of Racing
The patent race with a specific Ω and D creates a dynamic game between two firms 5 . Let x i,t denote firm i's stage at time t. We assume that each firm starts at stage 0; therefore, x 1,0 = x 2,0 = 0. If firm i is at stage n then it can either stay at n or advance to n + 1 6 , where the probability of jumping to n + 1 depends on firm i's investment, denoted a i ∈ A = [0,Ā] ⊂ R + . The upper boundĀ on investment is chosen sufficiently large so that it never binds in equilibrium. Firm i's state evolves according to
There are many functional forms we could use for p (x|a, x). We choose a probability structure so that innovation resembles search and sampling. Let F (x|x) = p (x|1, x), that is, F (x|x) is the probability 5 We focus on the duopoly case for reasons of tractability and ease of exposition. We also believe that the duopoly case can serve as a valid approximation for the monopolistically competitive markets where most innovations take place. 6 We have computed solutions to our model with firms being able to advance more than one stage in each period.
These changes do not lead to any results that contradict the basic insights of this paper. Computational results with larger jumps can be obtained from the authors upon request.
that there is no change in the state if a = 1. For general values of a we assume
This specification is analogous to hiring a people to work for one period and having them work independently on the problem of moving ahead one stage. While this specification is a special one, its simple statistical foundation helps us interpret our results. 7 During R&D, firm i's cost function is C i (a), i = 1, 2. It is assumed to be strictly increasing and weakly convex in a. For the remainder of the paper, we assume the cost function for firm i takes the following form
Firms discount future costs and revenues at the common rate of β < 1 and maximize their expected discounted payoffs.
Equilibrium
The patent race involves two phases. When one of the firms reaches stage D, it is awarded the patent and becomes the only innovator. We refer to the subsequent innovation stages as the monopoly phase and denote it by X M = {D, D + 1, . . . , N }. Prior to the monopoly phase the position of the two firms is described by x = (x 1 , x 2 ). We refer to the set of states before the patent is granted as the duopoly phase and denote it by
. Since we employ backward induction to solve for the equilibrium of the game, we first solve for the monopoly phase and then for the duopoly phase.
Monopoly Phase
Firm i precedes as a monopoly after it receives the patent. We formulate firm i's monopoly problem recursively. At the terminal stage N , the innovation process is over and firm i receives a prize of Ω.
In stages D through N − 1, it spends resources on investment. Let V M i (x i ) denote the value function of firm i if it is a monopoly in state
The policy function a M i of a firm i monopolist is defined by
Proposition 1 Proof. See Appendix A.
Duopoly Phase
We formulate the competition between the firms before stage D as a duopoly game. In the analysis of this game we restrict attention to Markov strategies. A pure Markov strategy
i is a mapping from the state space X to its investment set A. We define the firms' value functions recursively. Let V i (x) represent the value of firm i's value function if the two firms are in state
We use the conventional notation that is defined as follows:
If neither firm has received the patent, the Bellman equations for the two firms are defined by
The optimal strategy functions of the firms must satisfy
We now define the Markov perfect equilibrium of the race. 
Definition 1 A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of value functions

Given the value functions V i , and the strategy function of his opponent, the strategy function
A Markov perfect equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 1 There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our model does not admit a closed form solution. We use numerical methods to establish our results and check their robustness by computing the optimal patent policy for a large collection of cases covering a broad range of parameter specifications. Our computational results are discussed in Section 4 and our numerical procedure is detailed in Appendix B.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature that studies the implications of R&D competition on the design of optimal patent policy and bridges a gap between two distinct lines of research. The first of these lines focuses on R&D competition, taking patent policy as given. The second endogenizes patent policy, but largely abstracts from the R&D competition that precedes the award of the patent.
Early contributions to the first line of research include Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Loury
(1979), Lee and Wilde (1980) , Reinganum (1981 Reinganum ( , 1982 and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a,b) . In these models, the probability that a firm successfully obtains a patent at each date depends only on the firm's current R&D expenditure and not on its past R&D experience. Competition takes place in "memoryless" or "Poisson" environments (see also the survey article by Reinganum (1989) ). This first generation of models was subsequently extended by Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Vickers (1985a,b, 1987) to incorporate learning or experience effects. Throughout, patent policy was taken as given.
In contrast, contributions to the second line of research, including Nordhaus (1969), Klemperer (1990), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) , O'Donoghue, Scotchmer, Thisse (1998), Denicolo (1999 Denicolo ( , 2000 , two stages of innovation only. We consider a multistage innovation race which enables us to make a distinction between the stage at which a patent can be awarded and the stage at which an innovation is successfully completed. This distinction is also made by Perry and Vincent (2002), whose focus is on an implementation problem that induces the laggard participants in a patent/procurement race to drop out without distorting incentives to invest when the planner does not know the innovation stage firms are in. Our environment differs from theirs along a few lines. First, the informational asymmetry in our model stems from the inability of the planner to observe the cost of investment, rather than the innovation phase. Second, in our setting, the prize to the winner of the patent, which incorporates patent length and breadth, is endogenously determined, and is not a parameter. Third, we explicitly incorporate into our model externalities from monopoly distortions or deadweight loss of taxes used to finance them. Incorporation of these externalities into the model allows us to study the effectiveness of races in spurring innovation when the ability of the patent authority to use prizes is limited. We do, however, abstract from possible transactions and cooperation between innovators modeled in Scotchmer and Green (1995) , even where such cooperation may be socially beneficial.
In an extension of this paper, we have examined equilibrium with technology trades and found conditions under which they will occur. We have checked that the results for optimal patent rules considered in this paper are not significantly affected by these trades. of patents are all represented by the prize in our setting. We choose our parameters of the model so that the imposition of a reasonable time limit on the duration of innovation from the time a firm gets the patent to the time it reaches the final stage is not binding.
Patent races are not the only mechanism for spurring innovation. Research tournaments, where contestants compete to find the innovation with the highest value to the sponsor and receive a prespecified prize if successful, can be and are used to achieve a similar goal. Research tournaments are particularly useful when research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by courts. Taylor (1995) , Fullerton and McAfee (1999) are amongst the papers that study such tournaments, the former in an environment with identical firms, the latter with firms of heterogenous ability. Innovation races and research tournaments differ both in institutional and model details.
In a single, well-defined innovation race, the quality requirement is fixed, the time of innovation is variable. The focus in on the pace of innovation and the competition between the firms. In a research tournament, quality is variable, the terminal date, on the other hand, is fixed. In research tournaments, the emphasis is on the quality of the product, not on the pace of innovation. In the McAfee-Fullerton model, an entry auction filters out less efficient firms, in our model, filtering is achieved by varying the quality requirement in most cases, even when auctions are available. Our goal is to endogenize the choice of races and to study the changes in the innovation pace and intensity when quality requirements and prizes are chosen optimally. Thus we find patent races to be the most natural environments 8 in which to achieve this goal.
Results
In this section we report results from our computational procedure detailed in Appendix B.
Benchmark case
We begin our analysis with a simple, canonical example with linear technology, identical firms, and no deadweight loss associated with the prize. This is the case that's been extensively studied in the innovation race literature. In this special case, there is obviously no value to a race since the PGA's problem can be perfectly internalized in a firm's profit maximizing strategy. If the PGA awards the project to one firm with the full social value as the prize before any of the firms start investing Proposition 2 serves a useful benchmark, but relies on the assumption that monopolies have no efficiency costs or that taxes paid to the innovator have no distortionary cost. As we have stressed in the introduction, we are interested in examining optimal patent rules when these inefficiencies and distortions are present. In the following sections, we report the changes in optimal patent rules as we 8 See Scotchmer (1999) for an environment in which the patent system is optimal. She shows that if a direct mechanism cannot use ex-post information on value or costs, the only feasible incentive mechanisms are patent renewals systems with fees.
move away from this special case of θ = 0. We also report results with heterogeneous and nonlinear costs.
Model Parameterization
We now move away from the simple benchmark example by incorporating the inefficiencies associated with rewards, heterogenous firms and non-linear technology. Table 1 displays the set of parameters we use in our numerical computations. 
Social Surplus Maximization
We now examine the case of social surplus maximization and the impact of cost heterogeneity and deadweight losses in optimal patent rules. Throughout this and subsequent sections, we use the term short (long) race to describe a patent awarded at a lower (higher) innovation stage. The terms slow and quick are used to describe the time it takes for firms to complete the innovation.
Deadweight Loss and Homogenous Firms
We first examine the effect of deadweight losses in optimal patent rules by including a positive θ while maintaining the assumption that firms are homogenous and have linear costs of investment.
There are important reasons for considering identical and linear costs. If firms are heterogeneous, the planner would prefer a race to ensure that the more efficient firm is not eliminated by bad luck. If firms have convex costs, the planner would also prefer a race since two firms can achieve a rate of total innovation more cheaply than each can do individually. By assuming linear and homogenous costs, we isolate the effect of product market distortions on the patent rules. In this case the only reason for having a race and bearing the efficiency costs of duplicated effort is to reduce the deadweight loss associated with the patent prize. Figure 2 shows that when θ is small, the planner prefers innovation with a monopolist as in the benchmark case of no deadweight loss, but when θ exceeds 0.25, the planner switches to using a race. Note that θ = 0.25 is a small value for deadweight losses; for a monopolist with a linear demand curve θ = 0.50 . Figure 2 shows that the planner prefers a race even in the presence of small deadweight losses in the product market. Figure 2 also displays how the optimal choice of γ is affected by the deadweight loss parameter θ and the choice of D. When θ = 0, γ * = 1, but γ * falls rapidly as θ increases. Even when the planner chooses monopolistic innovation, the optimal prize gives the innovator only a small fraction of the total social benefit. These small values of γ correspond to a combination of a short patent life and small patent breadth. Furthermore, as θ increases and the planner chooses to switch to a race, the optimal γ falls even further. For example, at θ = 0.30, the optimal γ * = 0.1 for the race, but would have been 0.16 if D = 0 were optimal. When the planner switches to a race, there is duplication of effort, but this is ameliorated by reducing the prize. In cases with θ ≥ 0.25, the planner relies more on the competition in the race rather than the prize to stimulate innovation because the deadweight loss associated with the patent is large.
Heterogeneous Firms
We next add firm heterogeneity, but maintain the linear cost assumption. Table 2 reports, for a variety of θ values, the optimal prize, choice of D and social surplus as the cost asymmetry between firms increase. When firms are homogenous, and there is deadweight loss associated with the patent, the planner relies more on the competition in the race rather than the prize to stimulate innovation. Hence the length of the race, measured by D * is increasing in θ. When firms are sufficiently heterogenous (c ≥ 1.5) however, without a large enough prize, the less efficient firm finds it too costly to race for a long time and virtually drops out, providing no competition for the more efficient firm. In this case, the planner increases the prize relative to the case of c = 1, and shortens the race length to provide incentives for faster innovation. In the presence of cost heterogeneity, the optimal race length, D * is decreasing in θ.
Convex Costs
We next consider the case of convex investment costs. Figure 3 shows the optimal prize to benefit ratio γ * , and expected discounted social surplus W S as a function of the cost ratio of the two firms, c, when η = 1.5 and θ = 0. Each line in Figure 3 corresponds to a different patent granting stage
The maximized social surplus is the upper envelope of the three lines in Figure 3 . Therefore the optimal patent granting stage is the D that corresponds to the highest line for a given cost ratio.
In this case, when investment costs are convex, the planner prefers both firms to engage in R&D because given a target rate of innovation, it is more efficient to have both firms working. Therefore not all duplication of effort is wasteful. When firms have similar costs, and the deadweight loss parameter θ = 0, the optimal policy is to grant a patent to one of the firms before any investment is undertaken. Although a coin toss may grant the patent to the less efficient firm, the resulting loss in social surplus is less than the inefficient rent dissipation during a race. This result is overturned as c competition and prizes. When the deadweight loss of a prize, θ = 0, as in Figure 3 , the PGA prefers sets a long race (D * = 5), which enables it to filter out the less efficient firm. Table 3 reports the optimal policy rules in the presence of deadweight loss, firm heterogeneity and convex costs. With θ = 0, the PGA could use prizes to balance the benefits of quick innovation and total cost of investment. As in the case of linear cost, the trade-offs the PGA faces are more complex when the deadweight loss is high and its ability to vary the prize to spur innovation and competition is more constrained. In these cases, the PGA is compelled to use races for quick innovation. A long race (high D) can stimulate investment and competition, when firms are alike. If firms are sufficiently heterogeneous, long races must be coupled with a large prize to motivate the inefficient firm to compete. Large prizes are very costly in this environment, unlike the previous case with θ = 0, consequently a shorter race is chosen to motivate Firm 2 by increasing its chances of winning the patent. However, this has an adverse effect; a short race is a less effective mechanism for filtering out Firm 2, thus social surplus declines for high values of θ, as the cost ratio increases and races become shorter. This adverse effect persists until Firm 2's R&D costs are so large that it does not participate even in a short race. At that point, a short race can filter Firm 2 out, but works less effectively as an incentive device: a decrease in competition allows Firm 1 to reduce its investment level and leads to slower innovation. The comparative statics results reported in Table 3 highlight the fact that the insights from the single example depicted in Figure 3 are robust to alternative parameterizations. Another interesting comparative static is with respect to the discount factor. Our numerical exercises 10 have shown that as the discount factor decreases, the present value of the prize decreases and that dampens the incentive for a high investment level. Conditional on having a race of nontrivial duration the discount factor is inversely related to the optimal γ * : higher prize levels are needed to motivate the firms.
Summary 1
The following results hold for η > 1.
Social surplus is decreasing in θ.
Conditional on the presence of a race, (a) the optimal patent stage D * is weakly decreasing in θ and c.
(b) the optimal prize ratio γ * is weakly decreasing in the discount factor and the deadweight loss coefficient θ.
Our results so far indicate that any patent policy analysis that does not include the deadweight loss associated monopolies and prizes would recommend starkly different patent rules depending on the diversity of firms engaged in innovation. It would favor larger prizes and no race under homogeneity and a very long race and smaller prizes when reasonable heterogeneity is present 11 .
It would also suggest that filing requirements be tailored to industry or innovation specific cost asymmetry. This would render the adoption and implementation of a universally applied patent system very difficult. Our (social surplus maximizing patent policy) analysis indicates that when the deadweight losses are explicitly considered, and they are of a reasonable magnitude, the optimal patent rule is less dependent on cost asymmetry. It favors granting of patents at middle stages of development and reduction of patent length/breadth to decrease patent prizes. Patents should be easier to obtain, but less valuable.
Consumer Surplus Maximization
We next examine the case where the planner maximizes consumer surplus. In this case, the cost of innovation does not enter the PGA's objective function, so the PGA is only concerned about the duration of the race and the fraction of the benefit that consumers can retain. A reduction of the prize to the innovator increases consumer benefits, but slows down the arrival of the innovation. One way to relieve this tension is to use races to stimulate investment. Several patterns are apparent in Figure 4 . Consumer surplus decreases as the cost asymmetry rises. At small cost ratios the PGA can rely on the intense competition among the firms to ensure that the firms innovate quickly. Since the competition provides ample motivation for high investment levels, the PGA can set the prize-to-benefit ratio γ to be very low and the patent stage to D = N = 5.
As c rises, the intensity of competition decreases since the inefficient firm reduces investment. The
11 If the cost ratio is substantially high, the less efficient firm never invests, transforming the race effectively into a monopoly innovation. In this case, the PGA raises the prize and eventually becomes indifferent among all D ≥ 1.
PGA remedies this by increasing γ and by choosing a lower D. These changes spur both firms to work harder in the duopoly phase without creating too much risk that the inferior firm wins. In Figure 4 , γ * increases from 0.10 to 0.12 and D * decreases from 5 to 2. As c increases further, even a short duopoly phase is not enough to motivate the firms. Since the PGA is reluctant to increase γ, the race becomes, for all practical purposes, just a monopoly innovation process by the more efficient firm. Thus the PGA is indifferent between setting D to any value between 1 to N . Table 4 displays results for sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameters η, c, and θ and confirm that the results displayed in Figure 4 are robust to changes in these parameters. The optimal γ * is always much smaller than under the objective of social surplus maximization, and changes only slightly as deadweight loss, θ, and the cost ratio c change. Consumer surplus is decreasing in both of these parameters.
The pattern of the D * values reported in Table 4 provides insights into the structure of our model and, in particular, highlights the difference between strictly convex costs and linear costs. As the cost of investment for Firm 2 increases, its investment level declines; Firm 2 poses less of a competitive threat to Firm 1. In order to motivate both firms, the PGA lowers the optimal patent stage D * , but this policy only partially motivates the firms to choose higher investment levels. When the cost of innovation is linear in investment effort and the cost ratio is sufficiently large, Firm 2 reduces its investment level to zero and exits the race. Consequently, the probability of this firm advancing is zero, and the optimal patent stage D * is set to 1. When the cost function is strictly convex, Firm 2 never chooses a zero investment level since C (0) = 0, and always has a chance of reaching stage 1 before Firm 1. As a result, the optimal D * is always greater than 1. In some cases, for example, at a cost ratio of c = 3 and θ = 0, D * may become as low as 2. The results from consumer surplus maximization can be summarized as follows. Table 1. 1. The optimal patent policy has a nontrivial race, D * > 0.
Summary 2 When the PGA maximizes consumer surplus the optimal patent policy exhibits the following properties for parameters listed in
The optimal prize to benefit ratio, γ * , is smaller than when the PGA maximizes social surplus,
weakly decreasing in θ.
The optimal patent granting stage, D * , is weakly decreasing in θ.
4. For sufficiently small cost ratios, the optimal patent granting stage, D * , is weakly decreasing in c. 
As the cost ratio c rises to infinity
The expected duration of innovation process is longer due to lower investment level compared
to the social surplus maximization case.
Consumer surplus is weakly decreasing in c.
Auctions for allocating patent rights
In light of the popularity of auctions in the literature of mechanism design, some people may argue that auctions at stage 0 would be a more efficient way of allocating patent rights. It thus appears to be worthwhile to examine auctions in our environment. In an extension of this paper, Judd, Schmedders, Yeltekin (2007) provides a comprehensive comparison between auctions and races as innovation mechanisms. Here we report some of the results from that extension, to emphasize the importance of incorporating deadweight loss of prizes, parameterized by θ, into the patent policy analysis. Suppose the PGA would hold a second-prize sealed-bid auction for the patent rights with a prize of Ω = γB. The PGA's payoff from an auction of patent rights before any investment or innovation takes place is the following:
where W Auc (i, 0) is the time t = 0 expected present discounted consumer surplus from the innovation when firm i is the innovator. It is formally defined as:
The values V M i (0) and V M j (0) represent the private values of the patent monopoly to firm i and j respectively and are defined as follows. For k = i, j :
The parameter α is the Pareto weight placed on the firms, and is set to 0 when the PGA maximizes consumer surplus and to 1 in the case of social surplus maximization. In a second price auction where the winning firm pays the second bid, it is a well known result that the dominant strategy for each firm is to bid exactly its expected net present value of the patent. In our environment, these private values are equal to the monopoly values for each firm. Under such a bidding strategy, the more efficient firm, Firm 1, would always win the patent. Observe that we have already calculated the social surplus from such an auction for all possible values of c and θ. Tables 5 and 6 report the maximized social surplus from the patent race for η = 1.0 and η = 1.5 and when firms are homogenous. The social surplus from the second price auction
is equivalent to the social surplus from the race with homogenous firms when D is set to 0. Tables 2 and 3 With a race of nontrivial duration, the PGA can achieve faster innovation than the auction can for the same prize. Hence for θ ≥ 0.25, the PGA prefers races. When the PGA is maximizing consumer surplus, i.e., when α = 0, then the revenue from the auction is
It is clear from these tables (and
If firms have the same cost, then the consumer and social surplus maximizing auctions yield the same revenue. These revenues are reported in Table 7 for η = 1.0. Table 8 reports the consumer surplus from the optimal patent races for the same parameters. For homogenous firms, when θ ≥ 0.4, races dominate auctions as innovation mechanisms. In the auction, larger prizes are needed to motivate the monopoly innovator and these prizes are very costly when the deadweight loss is high. In contrast, prizes are lower in the patent race, but larger filing requirements (D * = 4) spark competition and lead to faster innovation and deliver a higher consumer surplus. 
Optimal Uniform Rules for Heterogeneous Innovations
In the previous sections, we assumed that the PGA knows the exact, ex-ante social value of the innovation, B, and the innovation technologies of the two firms but not their identity. Specifically, we assumed that the PGA knows the parameters of the two cost functions, but does not know any particular firm's costs; it must therefore offer the same incentives to all firms. 12 In reality, a patent authority must choose race rules that apply across a broad range of industries and products, rather than rules tailored to specific firms or innovations. This corresponds to Congress passing patent law. Therefore we now consider the case where the PGA's information about the social value of the invention and the firms' technologies is poor; it only knows the distributions of social values and cost ratios and their support, but not their exact values. Thus, it must set rules which apply to a large set of races. Specifically, we assume that the PGA's beliefs about B are given by the probability density function g (B) , that its beliefs about c = c 2 /c 1 are represented by the density f (c), and that its beliefs across B and c are independent. Given these beliefs, a social surplusmaximizing PGA maximizes the expected discounted social surplus, c,
, and a consumer surplus-maximizing PGA maximizes the expected discounted consumer surplus,
12 It may be possible to elicit information about a firm's costs. It may also be possible to hire firms to conduct R&D under the guidance of some central planner. However, that is not what a patent system does. Our analysis is a long way from being a fully specified mechanism design analysis; it represents instead the nature of feasible alternatives within a patent system. Our focus in this paper is on patent races, therefore we abstract from policies that would allow the PGA to conduct its own research and development by employing the firms in question.
In order to study this problem, we need to specify f (c) and g(B). We do not aim to execute a carefully calibrated exercise since the necessary data is not available. However, we do want to compute some "average" patent rules, illustrate the ease with which we can incorporate this into our analysis, and demonstrate the robustness of our previous results to this more general case.
Therefore, we use the little data available to construct interesting examples. Pakes (1986) provides some documentation on the benefits of innovation for some European countries, and shows that their distribution is highly skewed: most innovations have very little or no social value and a few innovations have very large values. However, these are ex-post realized values on innovations.
Since the patent rules we analyze are chosen before any social value is realized, the relevant data for our model is the ex-ante distribution of values held by firms when they enter a patent race. Nevertheless, we assume that Pakes's empirical evidence represents an approximation for the distribution of ex-ante social values, so we use highly skewed distributions for B in our numerical results.
The following table displays the two distributions, B 1 and B 2 , for social values we use in our computations. B 1 and B 2 differ in their supports. The first row in Table 9 displays the support of B 1 and the second row the support for B 2 . The third row presents the probabilities for the possible values of B i . For example, the probability that B 1 = 10 is 0.5 and the probability that B 2 = 100 is 0.5. We use four possible distributions for the cost ratio c. We have little data on this, so we examine four cases. We assume that c 1 = 1; this is a normalization. First, we examine two possible uniform distributions over a finite set of possible values denoted Z = {z 1 , .., z 9 }. The first, denoted U 1 assumes z i = 1 + (i − 1).25. The second, denoted U 2 assumes z i = i. We look at both cases since they represent different degrees of heterogeneity in costs and different lack of information for the PGA. We do not want the results to strongly depend on the uniform specification. Therefore, we also consider two triangular distributions for c. More precisely, these distributions assume that the probability that c = z i is (10 − i)/45. We look at two possibilities for Z = {z 1 , .., z 9 }. The first, denoted T 1 , is z i = 1 + (i − 1).25, and the second, denoted by T 2 , is z i = i.
With these probability densities, we now compute the PGA's optimal policies. Table 10 costs. As we saw before, in these cases races are useful to filter out the inefficient firms and motivate the efficient firm. However, the optimal γ is far less than one when there are races, reflecting our earlier finding that small γ's are desirable to avoid excessive duplication of effort. As we move right in Table 10 , the range of possible values for B increases and we see a tendency towards no race and towards setting γ = 1. This reflects that fact that when B is large enough, it is preferable for some firm to proceed with the innovation quickly and efficiently, so there is no race and the firm that is awarded the patent receives all social benefits. We find that no race is desirable under B 2 , unless the cost heterogeneity is so large that a race is needed to filter out inefficient firms. We have also computed the optimal policies for θ > 0; as θ increases, races become more desirable, for the same reasons cited in Section 4. 
We next compute the policies that maximize expected discounted consumer surplus. Table 11 reports the results when θ = 0. As before, full length races (i.e. D * = N ) with small γ are part of the optimal policy if firms' costs are not too variable and the benefits from innovation are large. In these cases, the competitive efforts of the firms are sufficient to provide consumers with benefits even when the prize γ is small. In particular, as the mean and variance of firms' costs increases, races are used to filter out the inefficient firms but only after their presence has motivated the efficient firms to work hard. The resulting duplication of effort is of no concern to consumers. The results in Tables 10 and 11 present a few examples, but show that the results from the conditional analyses in Section 4 are robust to the more general case where the PGA must choose rules that apply over a wide variety of races.
Extensions and Conclusions
Patent races are an integral part of the R&D process, but they do not represent the complete innovation process. A firm that has been granted a patent typically needs to incur additional costs and develop the product further before it can be produced and sold. We present an analysis of how the two parameters of the race -when the patent or exclusive contract is awarded and the winning prize -should be chosen in a simple multistage race.
We find that races of nontrivial duration are part of an optimal policy under most circumstances.
The choice between short and long races depends on the social returns to innovation, the planner's objective (social vs. consumer surplus), and the inefficiency costs of compensating the patent winner.
In general, in environments with high inefficiency costs and externalities that restrict the rewards to the patentholder and firm heterogeneity, it is optimal for patents to be awarded earlier in the innovation process, but not at the very initial stage. Thus races are short, but not of trivial duration.
In our setting, the patent race serves two purposes. First, it motivates the firms to invest and complete the innovation process quickly. When the prize causes inefficiencies, such as the monopoly grant implicit in a patent, using a race allows the planner to reduce the size of the prize and still
give firms incentives to invest in innovation. Second, a race filters out inferior innovators since they cannot keep up with more efficient ones. This is important for the planner since it cannot observe firms' costs. When the planner maximizes consumer surplus, the important trade-off is the speed of innovation versus the prize needed to compensate the firms. In this case, prizes are lower and patent stages higher compared to the social surplus maximization case.
We show that in an environment with inefficient transfer mechanisms, longer races are preferred when firms are homogenous and shorter races are chosen otherwise. This result overturns the conventional wisdom that when firms are likely to compete fiercely, i.e., when they possess identical technologies in a simultaneous-move race, short races are preferable because they avoid excessive investment. Our analysis shows that this is true only when there is very little constraint on the prizes a patent authority can give. When there are limitations present, longer races are preferred because they fulfill the role of prizes in providing incentives for innovation.
Our model allows us to understand the fundamental issues of developing a patent policy and identifying the complex trade-offs a patent authority faces. The environment we consider is a simple one, but our subsequent work indicates that the results are robust to many possible extensions. For example, one immediate extension is to consider races where firms can advance more than one stage at a time. We computed many such examples; they do not provide any substantial additional insights into the workings of the model. We have also studied cases where the technology of investment, i.e.
the distribution F , depends on the stage of the innovation process. Again, no additional insights in terms of the trade-offs a patent authority faces were delivered by the modified technologies.
Another interesting extension is to allow firms to trade their technologies. It is straightforward to allow firms in our model to negotiate technology trades at each stage, similar to the trades examined in Green and Scotchmer (1995) . In the context of our model, the technology leader may want to sell its technology to the laggard. We have studied this extension and found it to have no significant impact on the results for optimal patent policies.
Our results indicate that once a firm receives protection from competition, it reduces its investment level and slows the innovation process. The PGA varies the patent granting stage and the prize to induce firms to innovate quickly. In actual patent policy, there is a time limit on how long a product is protected under a patent. If firms develop the product too late, then they may not receive any (substantial) prize. This time limit could also serve both as a filtering device and an incentive for quick innovation, and therefore the planner may not rely on a race to differentiate between firms and spur investment. However, in all of the examples we computed, we chose parameters so that the time it takes for the firms to move from the patent-granting stage to the terminal innovation stage is short. Thus, the time limit of a patent would not significantly change any result.
It may be possible to devise other additional policy instruments that may remedy some of the inefficiencies that arise in the innovation race. One of the contributions of this paper is to identify the trade-offs the patent authority and firms face as the two fundamental features of patent policy -when a patent is granted and its associated prize -change, so that the choice of additional instruments is not made arbitrarily.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We present the proof of this proposition for the case of strictly convex costs. The proof easily extends to the linear cost case, but it gets messy due to the possibility of corner solutions. In the trivial case Ω = 0 we have V M i (x i ) = 0 and a * (x i ) = 0 for all x i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N }. Thus, we assume throughout the proof that Ω > 0. The proof proceeds in four steps. First, we prove that there exists a solution to the Bellman equation. Second, we show that the value function is nondecreasing in the state. Third, we prove that there exists a unique optimal policy function.
Finally, we show that the policy function is nondecreasing in the state. 
.
. For the remainder of the proof we make use of the special form of the transition probability function p. Without loss of generality we assume that F is independent of the state x i and write
. . , N }. Note that the optimal effort level is always in the interior of the set A. Given the value function V M i , a necessary (and sufficient) first-order condition for the optimal effort level is
This equation must have a least one solution according to the first step of this proof. The second derivative of the function on the left-hand side equals
Hence, there is a unique optimal effort a * (x i ).
Given the value V M
i (x i + 1), the optimal effort a * (x i ) and value V M i (x i ) must be the (unique) solution of the following system of two equations in the two variables a and V, respectively,
An application of the Implicit Function Theorem reveals that both variables in the solution are nondecreasing functions of the value V M i (x i + 1). The Jacobian of the function on the left-hand side at the solution equals
The gradient of the function on the left-hand side with respect to the parameter V M i (x i + 1) equals
where Proof of Theorem 1. we present again the proof for the case of strictly convex costs. For a given patent policy (D, γ) the strategy functions σ * i , i = 1, 2, constitute a Markov perfect equilibrium if they simultaneously solve equations (6) . The proof is by backward induction. If x i = D for some i, then an optimal strategy pair σ * i (x i , x −i ), i = 1, 2, and a pair of value functions V i , i = 1, 2, trivially exist. It is now sufficient to prove that for any state (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X with x i < D, i = 1, 2, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (a * 1 , a * 2 ). To prove the existence of such an equilibrium we define a continuous function f on a convex and compact set such that any fixed point of this function is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Given are a state (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X with x i < D, i = 1, 2, and values
from the states that can be reached from (x 1 , x 2 ) in one period. As in the proof of Proposition 1 we assume without loss of generality that the transition probability distribution is independent of the state and we write F (x i |x i ) = F, i = 1, 2. We define a function f on a domain 
application of the Implicit Function Theorem shows that f i,1 is continuous in V i .
Next defineV i bý
In summary, we have defined a continuous function f = (f 1,1 , f 1,2 , f 2,1 , f 2,2 ) : S → S mapping the convex and compact domain S into itself. Brouwer's fixed-point theorem implies that f has a fixed
By construction of the function f this fixed point satisfies the equations (5) and (6) . This completes the proof of the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the state (x 1 , x 2 ).
B Computing Optimal Patent Policies
For any specific patent policy, (D, γ), we need to compute the equilibrium of the race which involves solving two dynamic problems. First, we solve the dynamic optimization problem for each firm after it wins the patent. Second, we solve the patent race in the duopoly phase. We discuss the solution procedures for these two problems in detail.
B.1 Computing the Monopoly Phase
The monopoly phase begins after one of the firms reaches stage D, which can take any value between 0 and N . Therefore, we solve the monopoly problem for all In addition to employing a standard value function iteration and implementing the Gauss-Seidel method for dynamic programming, (see p. 418 in Judd (1998)), we also occasionally use a second approach when the convergence criterion is very tight. This second approach solves a nonlinear system of first-order necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions are necessary and sufficient given our assumption on the cost and Markov transition functions. The conditions are as follows:
To find the solution to (8)- (11), we convert it into a nonlinear system of equations that guarantees a i to be nonnegative. For this purpose we define a i = max{0, α i } κ and λ i = max{0, −α i } κ where κ ≥ 3 is an integer and α i ∈ . Note that, by definition, equation (10) and inequalities (11) are immediately satisfied. Thus, the unique solution to the nonlinear system of the two equations (8) and (9) with a i = max{α i , 0} κ in the two unknowns V M i (x i ) and α i yields the optimal policy and the corresponding value function of the monopolist. 13 
B.2 Solving the Duopoly Phase by an Upwind Procedure
The duopoly game has a finite set of states and could be solved using the techniques of Pakes and McGuire (1994) . However, we have a special structure which allows for much faster computation. At each state (x 1 , x 2 ) , we compute an equilibrium action pair (σ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), σ 2 (x 1 , x 2 )) and the corresponding values (V 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), V 2 (x 1 , x 2 )) that satisfy conditions (5, 6) . This computational task is surprisingly difficult; a Gauss-Seidel iterated best reply approach, a natural choice in such dynamic games that solves each firm's problem sequentially and updates their best responses to each other's actions, typically does not converge in our setting. Consequently we employ an alternative algorithm.
We formulate the equilibrium problem in state (x 1 , x 2 ) as a nonlinear system of equations. The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. For i = 1, 2,
0 ≤ λ i , a i .
We transform this system of equations and inequalities into a nonlinear system of equations characterizing a Nash equilibrium at a state (x 1 , x 2 ) with x i , x −i < D. We set a i = max{0, α i } κ and λ i = max{0, −α i } κ in equations (12) and (13) and omit the complementary slackness conditions (14) and the inequalities (15) . The solutions to the resulting four nonlinear equations in the four unknowns V i (x i , x −i ) and α i for i = 1, 2, correspond to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Again we solve a constrained problem instead of an unconstrained problem since this choice results in a numerically much more stable procedure.
13 The constraint on the effort level a can only be binding when the cost function C is linear. Nevertheless we use the constrained-optimization approach involving a Lagrange multiplier even when we use strictly convex cost functions.
This approach is numerically much more stable than solving the first-order conditions of the unconstrained problem.
B.3 Optimal Patent Policy
The PGA maximizes its objective function W S or W C taking into consideration the effect of its policy (D, γ) on firms' investment. We parameterize the PGA's objective function in θ and B. Given the equilibrium strategies σ i (x) of the race and optimal policy function a M i (x) during the monopoly phase, we can define the social surplus function W S recursively as follows:
C i (σ i (x)) + β We solve the dynamic equilibrium of the patent race for a large discrete set of (D, γ) pairs to find the optimal PGA policy (D * , γ * ). The ratio γ takes values from a discrete set Γ ⊂ [0,γ]. We summarize all computational steps in the following algorithm. 
